Phorum 5.2.11 Release Candidate 1 released! SECURITY FIXES
Posted by Thomas Seifert
Phorum 5.2.11 Release Candidate 1 released! SECURITY FIXES April 24, 2009 04:05PM |
Admin Registered: 22 years ago Posts: 9,240 |
The first release candidate of Phorum-5.2.11 has been released today.
Its a bugfix release fixing a couple of issues unfortunately also a couple of security related issues, most of them being CSRF (also noted on Secunia).
Even though its a security release there have been A LOT of changes in the core to fix those and therefore we want to have a release candidate first.
As usual this release can be downloaded from our downloads page (development releases).
Please let us know any issues you might encounter with this version so the final release of 5.2.11 can be as bug-free as possible.
This is the excerpt from the changelog:
Thomas Seifert
Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 04/24/2009 04:15PM by Thomas Seifert.
Its a bugfix release fixing a couple of issues unfortunately also a couple of security related issues, most of them being CSRF (also noted on Secunia).
Even though its a security release there have been A LOT of changes in the core to fix those and therefore we want to have a release candidate first.
As usual this release can be downloaded from our downloads page (development releases).
Please let us know any issues you might encounter with this version so the final release of 5.2.11 can be as bug-free as possible.
This is the excerpt from the changelog:
2009-04-22 09:12 ts77 * additional CSRF protection in the admin. Now a new token is generated when accessing the admin without a valid token in the url. This token is timed out after 15 minutes and requires manual click to continue. 2009-04-21 09:19 mmakaay * Fix for #844: avoid the use of addslashes() for SQL escaping in the Spam Hurdles module in favor of phorum_db_interact(), so other database layers can be developed. Thanks to Radium Kolar for noticing. 2009-04-17 08:53 ts77 * corrected message after posting in a moderatored forum, removing a warning (fixing #845, thanks to Dready) 2009-04-14 13:35 mmakaay * Fixed #843: No need to have images/* in the distro sanity check as critical files, so I removed them from the file list. Thanks to Mathias for the idea. While I was at it, I updated the distro sanity check script to include new core distribution files in the distro list. 2009-04-13 23:03 mmakaay * Fix for #840: make database "charset" config parameter database layer independant, by putting the check in the db layer sanity check function instead of directly in the database sanity check script. This makes it possible to ignore the charset configuration parameter for database layers that do not require this parameter. 2009-04-13 10:50 mmakaay * Fixed XSS issues from #841. Thanks to cicatriz for reporting them. 2009-04-13 10:13 mmakaay * Fixed #842: make Spam Hurdles module database table name db layer independent. 2009-03-22 09:58 ts77 * added support for custom headers to the mail functions and the smtp-mail module, fixed message-id usage in smtp-mail module 2009-03-20 11:51 mmakaay * Some fixes for doc generation. 2009-03-15 11:13 ts77 * fixed APC cache-layer (#782, thanks to hcgtv for the report) 2009-03-14 05:01 brian * Added post form confirmation into message deletion process to protect against CSRF attacks 2009-03-14 01:44 ts77 * Made allowed redirection URLs for the login a setting in general settings (defaults to localhost and the phorum-url) and fixing with it an "Arbitrary Redirection Vulnerability" reported by Andrew Paterson 2009-03-13 16:39 mmakaay * Implemented a new hook "css_filter" that can be used for post-processing Phorum's CSS code (e.g. compression of the code). 2009-03-11 01:14 mmakaay * Added a layer of protection against CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery) attacks. Thanks to WHK for notifying us about the possible issues. 2009-03-11 00:42 mmakaay * Fixed a possible XSS issue in the Spam Hurdles module. Thanks to Andrew Paterson for notifying us about the issue. 2009-03-10 00:03 mmakaay * Implemented a new hook "get_template_file", which can be used to influence the phorum_get_template_file() function. The name of the template to load can be updated (e.g. to change "index_new" to "yourmod::index_new") and the template source file to use can be returned (e.g. to tell Phorum that the "pm" template has to be handled by a custom script named "./mods/yourmod/pm_page_handler.php"). 2009-03-06 17:40 brian * Fixing XSS issue in control.php 2009-02-18 17:08 ts77 * added after_merge / after_split hooks for acting on thread split/merge actions (fixing #828, thanks to so at deluxe-design.at) 2009-02-18 16:41 ts77 * moved pm_message array out of the condition to have the data available to the pm_sent hook in any case (fixing #827, thanks to so at deluxe-design.at) 2009-02-18 16:16 ts77 * (re-)added storing the user_id for message attachments, fixing #822 2009-02-01 19:30 mmakaay * Fix for #892: mb_substr() replacement function contained a typo. No big impact. The replacement function was not yet in use in core code. Only the smtp_mail module calls mb_substr(). Thanks to r.wetzlmayr for reporting the error! 2009-01-28 19:41 mmakaay * Fixed the BBcode parser for some old PHP systems. A problem in PHP caused the parser to not parse any BBcode tags. # The PHP problem was that the "\0" in a string was seen as a filled # character position. E.g. with $a="b", isset($a[1]) would yield TRUE. # This threw of the bbcode parse tree generator.
Thomas Seifert
Edited 1 time(s). Last edit at 04/24/2009 04:15PM by Thomas Seifert.
April 24, 2009 06:12PM |
Admin Registered: 24 years ago Posts: 4,495 |
For those that don't know what a CSRF attack is, you can read the Wikipedia page. The good news about CSRF is that it requires a privileged user to visit a page that contains the attacking URL in it. So, it is not a completely passive attack. Action is required. However, the bad news is, it is real. It can do real damage. Everyone out there is prone to these types of attacks, even sites like Amazon.
Issues like these are one reason that Phorum has always kept the admin login separate from the front end login. A CSRF attack on the admin would require that and admin user of the Phorum in question visits a site that has an attacking URL or script on it and then that they were also logged in to the admin. Now, alone our separation does not prevent CSRF. We admit that. But, these new changes do address the known issues with CSRF.
There are still things that could be done with CSRF attacks. However, for compatibility reasons between templates, we have decided to only focus on the destructive things that can be exploited. The few issues that remain are non-destructive actions. All of these will be addressed in a future release where, unfortunately, older templates are likely to be broken. We have some ideas for making a module that could bridge the gap between old templates and new, but nothing solid yet.
Phorum has had a decent record when it comes to security. There is only one bug free piece of software that I have ever seen (that was actually useful). We can only respond quickly and responsibly when there are such things brought to our attention.
I can assure you that any future Phorum development will be done with CSRF in mind.
Issues like these are one reason that Phorum has always kept the admin login separate from the front end login. A CSRF attack on the admin would require that and admin user of the Phorum in question visits a site that has an attacking URL or script on it and then that they were also logged in to the admin. Now, alone our separation does not prevent CSRF. We admit that. But, these new changes do address the known issues with CSRF.
There are still things that could be done with CSRF attacks. However, for compatibility reasons between templates, we have decided to only focus on the destructive things that can be exploited. The few issues that remain are non-destructive actions. All of these will be addressed in a future release where, unfortunately, older templates are likely to be broken. We have some ideas for making a module that could bridge the gap between old templates and new, but nothing solid yet.
Phorum has had a decent record when it comes to security. There is only one bug free piece of software that I have ever seen (that was actually useful). We can only respond quickly and responsibly when there are such things brought to our attention.
I can assure you that any future Phorum development will be done with CSRF in mind.
Brian - Cowboy Ninja Coder - Personal Blog - Twitter
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